Zachary Silbersher
Axsome Therapeutics sells Symbravo (meloxicam and rizatriptan benzoate) tablets. Apotex has filed an ANDA seeking to distribute a generic version of Symbravo, and in response, Axsome has brought suit under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The rub is that Axsome has listed an enormous number of patents in the Orange Book purportedly covering Symbravo. Can Apotex litigate its way through Axsome’s patent thicket, or will consumers be deprived a lower-cost generic formulation?
Symbravo is the combination of two old drugs, meloxicam and rizatriptan benzoate. Despite that, Axsome has somehow managed to list upwards of 94 patents in the Orange Book that purportedly cover the combination of two old drugs. After Apotex filed its ANDA, Symbravo asserted 75 patents against Apotex in litigation. On its face, this is a highly-unusual number of patents both to be listed in the Orange Book and to be asserted in an ANDA litigation. Indeed, it is not uncommon for drugs to be protected by only a handful of patents in the Orange Book. Apotex claims that, up until only a few years ago, only one or two small-molecule drugs had more than 35 patents listed in the Orange Book.
Given all that, Apotex has moved to dismiss Axsome’s lawsuit. Apotex makes two arguments that are not typical of a Hatch-Waxman litigation. Between the lines, Apotex is telegraphing to the court that Axsome’s lawsuit could potentially be an improper ploy to delay generic competition.
First, Apotex argues that Axsome’s lawsuit is an improper use of a patent-thicket to block a lower-cost generic formulation. Apotex points out that over 85 percent of small-molecule drugs are protected by not more than a handful of patents listed in the Orange Book. Apotex also claims that the number of patents itself—regardless of what they claim—makes entry of lower-cost generic formulations prohibitive, to the detriment of patients. According to Apotex,
[t]he sheer size and scope of this lawsuit jeopardizes Apotex’s attempt to bring to market a lower-priced, generic alternative to Symbravo . . . [and it] subject[s] Apotex to a Kafkaesque and cost-prohibitive nightmare requiring it to expend enormous amounts of money and resources to defend against what can only be described as a ‘patent thicket’ that Axsome has set up to guard its monopoly in the meloxicam+rizatriptan tablet market.
Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-16038-MEF-AME, ECF 52 at 16-17 (D.N.J. May 18, 2026).
Apotex points out that Axsome’s patents resulted from serial continuation applications that mined a single patent specification for minor tweaks to the essentially the same overall purported invention. This is typically a hallmark of patent-thickets, i.e., the product of serially-filed continuation applications that also include scores of terminal disclaimers. Indeed, I previously wrote about Axsome’s patent-thicket for a different drug, Auvelity, that compiled a thicket comprising 122 patents covering the same drug, where many of those patents included terminal disclaimers to avoid double-patenting rejections.
To put this more bluntly, without the patent legalese, if 50 patents each come from the same initial disclosure, and they includes scores of terminal disclaimers, that typically means the inventions among the patents are essentially indistinguishable. The terminal disclaimers are a mechanism where the Patent Office permits patenting a potentially indistinguishable invention from a prior one provided that the patent owner agrees both patents—the old one, and the new indistinguishable one—will expire at the same time. Technically, that means the patent owner gains no extra life on a prior invention. However, the time, cost and resources required for generics to litigate through those 50 patents can nevertheless be prohibitive. This is precisely why patent thickets can stifle competition without actually being the product of legitimate R&D.
Apotex’s policy arguments attacking Axsome’s patent thicket have been aired before, and they are not themselves outlier considerations that courts are not aware of. At the same time, there is not currently an established way for courts or the Patent Office to deal with patent thickets. For instance, consumers of Humira failed to tag the tactic as raising antitrust violations. Efforts by generics to fight against patent thickets during litigation itself have also not yet succeeded.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that Apotex’s policy arguments will successfully for the basis for dismissing Axsome’s lawsuit. That said, efforts by Apotex join generics and biosimilars and others within the industry towards building a louder and louder chorus against what Axsome has done in this instance—i.e., build an enormous wall of indistinguishable patents that, by their sheer number alone, make entry of lower-cost generics cost prohibitive.
Apotex’s second argument is less policy, and more focused on the facts of Axsome’s particular patents. Nevertheless, Apotex’s argument highlights that when a brand pharmaceutical company asserts dozens and dozens of patents in a single lawsuit, it is easier for those numbers to obscure the fact that assertion of many of those patents could itself be frivolous.
Apotex points out that 56 of the patents asserted by Axome are pharmaceutical compositions of meloxicam, and they each require a specific excipient, namely, sulfobutyl ether b-cyclodextrin, or “Sobedex.” Apotex, however, argues that its generic formulation lacks Sobedex, and therefore, Axsome must necessarily be relying upon the doctrine-of-equivalents to assert infringement. Apotex, however, argues that Axsome cannot avail itself of the doctrine of equivalents in this case because of another doctrine, namely, the disclosure-dedication doctrine. If that’s true, than 56 of the 75 patents asserted by Axsome should be unavailable to bar Apotex’s generic.
Taking a step back, a brief overview of how these different doctrines interact with one another is helpful. Patents directed to pharmaceutical compositions typically require a number of ingredients. For instance, one of Axome’s “Sobedex” patents is directed to a dosage that includes, among other things, meloxicam, a sulfobutyl ether β-cyclodextrin (SBEβCD) and a bicarbonate. For Axsome to prove that Apotex’s generic infringes this patent requires showing that Apotex’s drug includes at least these three ingredients. If Axsome cannot show that Apotex’s drug includes Sobedex, then there is no literal infringement. Axsome could, however, argue there is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. That argument would seek to establish that whatever ingredient Apotex is using in lieu of Sobedex is so substantially similar, it would be unjust not to find infringement.
The doctrine of equivalents, however, has its limitations. Under the dedication-disclosure doctrine, a patent holder, such as Axsome, cannot take recourse to the doctrine of equivalents—and thereby claim that Apotex’s swapped ingredient is equivalent to Sobedex—if Axsome previously disclosed an embodiment in its patent application with that swapped ingredient, but never claimed that embodiment. Put another way, if you disclose an embodiment of your invention in your patent application, but you never seek claims covering that embodiment, then you may be barred—under the dedication-disclosure doctrine—from subsequently that arguing that unclaimed embodiment, presumably sold by a competitor, infringes your patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
That is what Apotex is arguing here. Although the specifics about Apotex’s formulation is redacted in its briefs, Apotex essentially argues that Axsome’s patents disclosed the very ingredient that Apotex is using in lieu of Sobedex. However, because Axsome never claimed that ingredient, it would be unjust for Apotex to be liable for using an invention that Axome disclosed, but never claimed and was never awarded.
For its part, Axsome argues that the dedication-disclosure doctrine does not apply in this instance. Again, much of the argument is redacted, but Axsome appears to be suggesting that for the dedication-disclosure doctrine to apply, the patent applicant must have not only disclosed the alternative embodiment, but also had the opportunity to “decline to claim” that alternative embodiment.
Axsome’s argument may be pushing the law a bit farther than it can afford, and Apotex argues that Axsome is grafting an intent requirement upon the dedication-disclosure doctrine that is not there in the law. On balance, Apotex may have the better of the argument on the dedication-disclosure doctrine. That, however, does not guarantee that the court will grant the motion to dismiss. The court may prefer, instead, to allow the case to proceed through discovery at which point Apotex can once again assert the defense on summary judgment.
If the court denies the motion to dismiss, however, that result will itself be a loss for consumers. Apotex will be forced to conduct discovery on 75 patents, and even if it eventually wins, the time required to get to that win will permit prolonged monopoly pricing by Axsome based upon dozens of patents that may not be that distinguishable from each other. And who pays for that?